Tajallī names divine self-disclosure, but the claim concerns not simply something becoming visible. A passage may discuss the appearance of created forms or a transformation in the recipient’s awareness. Those uses need to be separated.
Wujūd traverses Ibn al-Arabi’s discussions of God, the world, and knowledge. Rendering it as a single modern metaphysical category can mask the difference between what is ultimately real and what appears in relational forms.
Fixed entities refer to determinate realities of possibles as considered in divine knowledge, rather than a warehouse of independently existing eternal objects. Their relation to outward manifestation is precisely the difficulty to investigate.
Thubūt (fixity) need not signify sensory existence. It can designate the determination of a possible as considered prior to the question of its outward occurrence.
Nonexistence may mark lack of outward manifestation, the status of the possible, or a relational judgment. Reading every occurrence as absolute nothingness erases distinctions in the argument.
The idea of renewed creation directs attention to changes in the cosmos and the non-identity of successive states. It is not, without further argument, a scientific claim about a universal physical refresh clock.
The Breath of the All-Merciful develops an analogy between breath, speech, and the manifestation of created forms. It is a metaphysical and exegetical image, not a physiological hypothesis.
ʿAmāʾ means cloud in ordinary usage and becomes an important technical image when commentators address receptivity and the first disclosure of forms. It should not be confused with a physical atmospheric cloud.
Barzakh can be a boundary that both separates and relates two terms, an eschatological state, or an imaginal intermediate realm. It is therefore a methodological mistake to impose one narrow sense on every occurrence.
Khayāl is not merely fiction or error. It has technical uses in describing image-forms, perception, and mediation between intelligible meaning and sensible appearance.
Later scholarship uses the “imaginal world” to discuss forms between pure intelligibility and sense. The phrase has a history that should not be retrojected unchanged onto every text ascribed to Ibn al-Arabi.
The divine names shape prayer, interpretation, and relations between divine attributes and the world. Their function cannot be reduced to a fixed vocabulary list detached from a passage’s speaker and setting.
Letters and words can function as scriptural symbols and technical images of speech and knowledge. Their use does not, by itself, establish numerical laws or modern physical theories.
Discussions of the individual substance concern metaphysical and cosmological distinctions. The old term “atom” in kalām does not map straightforwardly onto the particle physics of the present.
The perfect human is an integrative theological and metaphysical figure, not simply an exceptionally talented or ethically successful individual. The concept concerns relations of completeness, representation, and human receptivity.
The Muhammadan Reality belongs to a technical discourse relating prophecy, manifestation, and comprehensiveness. It must be distinguished from historical statements about the Prophet’s earthly life.
Vicegerency is an interpretive category about humanity, knowledge, and responsibility. Its theological use should not be silently conflated with political institutions that share the word.
Qalb can refer to the inner organ of receptivity and discernment rather than merely the anatomical heart. Its verbal associations with turning and change help explain its use in accounts of knowing.
Wilāya ranges across intimacy, spiritual proximity, and forms of guardianship. Claims about rank are embedded in a religious vocabulary that should not automatically be turned into sociological fact.
Maʿrifa speaks of knowledge understood as recognition and direct apprehension. It does not entail a blanket rejection of study or reasoning; the source often distinguishes kinds of knowledge and their conditions.
Kashf, or unveiling, names the removal of a veil from understanding or experience. It should not be read as an automatically verifiable report of supernatural facts.
Dhawq, literally tasting, conveys immediacy of experience. It marks a contrast with purely descriptive knowledge without rendering philological analysis or reason irrelevant.
Ishāra indicates an allusive mode of signifying that cannot always be paraphrased as a direct proposition. The form of the utterance and its intended audience matter.
Adab encompasses disciplined conduct, relational duties, and attentiveness to context. It is more than etiquette, and its prescriptions depend on the particular relationship described.
A maqām is a station or abiding realization discussed in spiritual pedagogy. Manuals differ in how stations are listed and ordered; no single chart should be imposed on all authors.
A ḥāl may denote a spiritual state, often described in contrast with a more settled station. The conventional pairing must not obscure an author’s specific account of experience.
Fanāʾ is often a description of self-effacement or the eclipse of self-assertion within awareness. It is not a literal claim that the body ceases to exist or that ethical obligations are abolished.
Baqāʾ describes abiding or continued subsistence in contrast with fanāʾ in many spiritual taxonomies. It should not be mistaken for biological immortality.
The quṭb, or pole, belongs to accounts of spiritual hierarchy. Such descriptions are claims within a theological tradition, not independently confirmed censuses of historical persons.
Abdāl is polysemous: it can describe people whose reprehensible qualities have been transformed or particular groups in transmitted hierarchies. Counts and classifications differ between reports.
“Unity of being” became an influential label in the reception of Ibn al-Arabi. Treating it as an exhaustive self-description of his work blurs differences among the primary corpus and later schools.